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Abstract
In this paper we develop a model to determine the value of the opportunity to invest
in a random start American real option. In contrast to a typical American option,
the random start option only exists if an exogenous event occurs materializing the
American option to invest. In addition, the effect of competition is also considered
in the model. A higher risk of competition and a higher probability of the exogenous
event promotes investment. Uncertainty has a non-monotonic effect on investment
timing.
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Under Competition
1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a model capable of determining the value of the opportunity to
invest in a random start American real option. In contrast to a typical American option,
the random start option (RSO)1 only exists if some exogenous event occurs. The random
(exogenous) event is assumed to be outside of the investor’s control, and only after it
occurs the (true) American option to invest materializes.
Several examples fit with this setting. An investment opportunity that depends on
the authorization of a public entity, which may eventually arrive in the future (e.g., the
license to transform a rural land, with construction limitations, into an urban one); an
R&D race where the discovery arrives randomly (Lint and Pennings, 1998); or a project
that depends on a technology developed by a third-party firm (e.g., the iPad was dependent
on an efficient multi-touch screen technology, developed outside Apple).
In the context of our examples, the initial capital investment could correspond to the
acquisition of the rural land with the expectation that it will be later transformed into
urban by the authorities (by acquiring the land the investor becomes proprietary of the
random start option). Similarly, the firm can invest in patenting the potential discovery
that may randomly arrive during the R&D process (the alternative that does not eliminate
competition would be to patent the discover only if and when it occurs). Finally, for the
last example, the firm can pay a third-party to secure exclusive rights in the case the
technology arrives, ensuring monopolistic rents.
Our paper closely relates to Armerin (2017). The author also considers a similar
American option that can only be exercised after a random period of time has passed. We
differ in two major ways. Firstly, in contrast to Armerin’s work, that considers that the
firm already owns the random start American option, we go one step back and consider
the decision to acquire the RSO. In other words, we depart from the assumption that the
firm is, ex ante, endowed with the random start option, modeling, instead, the decision
to acquire it. Secondly, we consider that the firm has no proprietary rights on the RSO,
incorporating competition for the acquisition of the option.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 develops the model for investing in a random
start American options under competition. Section 3 presents a numerical example with
a comparative statics, highlighting the main insights of the model. Section 4 concludes.
1We use interchangeably “random start American option”, “random start option”, or simply RSO.
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2 The Model
Consider a real asset that produces a stream of cash flows. The present value of these
cash flows, X(t), is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t) = αX(t)dt+ σX(t)dB(t) (1)
where X(0) = X > 0, α < r is the risk-neutral expected drift, r is the risk-free rate, σ the
instantaneous volatility, and dB is the increment of a Wiener process.
The investment in this project has two stages. The first stage, in which K1 is invested,
allows the firm to become a monopolist over the second stage of the project, eliminating
any possible competitive damage. However, the investment in this second stage, depends
on some exogenous event without which the project is noneffective. After this event, the
firm is entitled with a perpetual American option to invest, which requires a lump sum
investment of K2. However, notice that if the exogenous event happens to occur before
the firm invests K1 (i.e., before securing monopolistic rights over the second stage), the
option to invest in the project is shared with competitors.
This model considers three types of uncertainties. Firstly, the cash flows of the project
evolve randomly over time. Secondly, the effectiveness of the project depends on some
exogenous event. Lastly, competition is also considered by including the existence of
hidden rivals (Armada et al., 2011; Pereira and Armada, 2013; Lavrutich et al., 2016).
Figure 1 exhibits all possible states. In the beginning, the firm holds F (X). This is
a non-proprietary option to invest K1 and receive G(X), becoming a monopolist over the
next stage. Two possible events may occur while the firm holds F (X): the exogenous event
occurs (transforming F (X) into HC(X)) or a (hidden) competitor moves in and invests K1,
and F (X) becomes worthless for the company. After investing K1 the firm is entitled with
the monopolistic option G(X). This option ends-up to be H(X) if the exogenous event
occurs. H(X) is the perpetual American option to invest K2 and receive X. Additionally,
if the exogenous event occurs before the firm makes the first investment (before investing
K1), F (X) is transformed into HC(X), which corresponds to the non-monopolistic option
to invest in the second stage. Given that HC(X) can suddenly disappear if a competitor
preempts the firm, K1 can be paid in order to secure the position of monopolist of the
project (H(X)).
For solving the model we proceed backwards, starting with the last option H(X), and
then moving to the earlier stages.
2.1 The value of the project after the exogenous event
After the exogenous event that allows the firm to invest in the last stage, the firm can
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Figure 1: The solid lines represent the changes in the value functions as a result of
firm’s decisions (first stage and second stage investment). The dashed and
the dotted lines represent, respectively, the change in the value functions if
the exogenous event occurs or if the firm is preempted by a competitor.
waiting to secure the investment and faces the hidden competition.
2.1.1 The monopolistic right to invest in the last stage
Let H(X) be the value of the proprietary option to invest in the last stage, under which
the firm receives X in exchange for the sunk investment cost K2. Following the standard
procedures, H(X) is the solution to the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
1
2
σ2X2H ′′(X) + αXH ′(X)− rH(X) = 0 (2)
The solution is the well known option to invest value (McDonald and Siegel, 1986;
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
H(X) =
a1Xβ1 for X < X2X −K2 for X > X2 (3)
where




































2.1.2 The shared option to invest in the last stage
Let HC(X) be the value function of the option to invest when the firm may be preempted
by a hidden competitor, destroying the option value. That event is modeled as a Poisson




σ2X2H ′′C(X) + αXH
′
C(X)− rHC(X) + λC(0−HC(X)) = 0 (7)





















The firm can choose between two alternative strategies to kill competition: (1) to
stage the investment, investing K1 to secure a monopolistic position over the project, or
(2) invest immediately in the two stages (K1 +K2). The optimal strategy will be the most
valuable and not necessarily that with the earliest threshold.
Case 1: Staged investment
Under this strategy the firm will choose to secure the option to invest in the last stage
by paying K1 in the first stage and not pre-committing to the second stage investment.
Doing so, the firm acquires the exclusive option to invest H(X). It only makes economic
sense to stage the investment if the threshold of the second stage X2 has bot been reached.
Therefore, the value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions, at the threshold




















η1 for X < Xc11
a1X
β1 −K1 for Xc11 6 X < X2






























The condition that the threshold X2 must be greater that X
c
11 implies that the initial





For the limiting cases where competition is absent (λC = 0) or is imminent (λC →∞),
the condition becomes K1 < 0 and K1 < K2/(β1 − 1), respectively. When there are
no potential competitors, staging the investment is excluded because the firm holds an
exclusive option on the second stage investment, while when the competitor is about to
make the investment, the firm can pay the maximum amount K2/(β1 − 1) to secure the
investment. A higher risk of competition (higher λC or equivalently a higher η1) induces
the firm to be available to pay a larger K1. Notice that the higher the market uncertainty
(lower β1), the larger the amount a firm is willing to pay to secure the exclusive right to
later invest in the second stage.
Case 2: Investment in a single stage
Under this strategy the firm will choose the two investments (K1 + K2) in a single
stage, eliminating competition.
The following value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions, at the thresh-
old Xc12:
bXc12




η1−1 = 1 (17)
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produce the following solution:
HC(X) =






















A higher risk of competition (higher λC or higher η1) hastens investment (∂X
c
12/∂λC <
0). On the other hand, a higher market uncertainty (lower η1) deters investment.
2
Optimal strategy
A firm will prefer to stage the investment if the value of that strategy is higher than
that of the alternative single stage investment (b1 > b2), even if the threshold of the latter
(Xc12) is reached before the threshold of the former (X
c
11). The following condition must












It is possible to prove that this condition always holds.3 Therefore, we need only
condition (15) to define the optimal strategy.
2.2 The value of the project before the exogenous event
Before the exogenous event that allows the firm to invest in the last stage, the firm can
choose between securing the monopolistic option to invest or waiting and sharing the
option with hidden competitors. Let us assume that securing the investment before the
exogenous event can be less costly, i.e. the investment cost is θK1 (0 < θ 6 1).
2.2.1 The value of the monopolistic option invest in the first stage
After paying θK1, the firm secures the investment opportunity H(X) killing competition
and waits for the occurrence of the exogenous event that permits the investment in the
last stage. This event arrives according to a Poisson process with an intensity rate λE . Let
G(X) be the value of the monopolistic option, which must be the solution to the following
2Notice that ∂η1/∂σ < 0.





σ2X2G′′(X) + αXG′(X)− rG(X) + λE(H(X)−G(X)) = 0 (22)
The exogenous event can occur either before or after the thresholdX2 has been reached.






β1 for X < X2
c4X













































and a1 and X2 are as in Equations (4) and (6), respectively, and the constants a3 and a4
ensure that G(X) is continuous and differentiable along X:5
c1 =















2.2.2 The value of a random start American real option under competition
Let F (X) be the value of a random start American real option under competition, i.e. the




σ2X2F ′′(X) + αXF ′(X)− rF (X) + λE(HC(X)− F (X)) + λC(0− F (X)) = 0 (30)
where λE is the arrival rate of the exogenous event, and λC corresponds to the arrival rate
of a competitor that preempts the firm, killing the option value.
Depending on condition (15), HC(X) is given by Equation (12) or Equation (18), each
4After considering the boundary condition when X → 0 and X → ∞. This option corresponds to the
case presented in Armerin (2017). We use a different solution strategy that produces a different analytical
solution. Our numerical simulations have shown that the option values are exactly the same.
5Using the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at X2.
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of them with more than one branch.
Let X1 be the threshold for investment in the first stage. The following cases emerge:
Table 1: Investment strategy cases
1. Staged investment 2. Single stage investment
X1 < X
c
11 X1 > X
c
11 X1 < X
c
12 X1 > X
c
12
X1 < X2 A C E G
X1 > X2 B D F H
Staged investment occurs when condition in Equation (15) is met. The four cases for each investment
strategy arise depending on the model parameters.
The solution for the threshold, X1, and the option value, F (X), is obtained using the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:











Case 1: Staged investment










β1 − Λ3K1 for Xc11 6 X < X2
d5X
ψ1 + d6X



















































η1 for X < X1
G(X)− θK1 for X > X1
(38)
where






and the trigger, X1, is numerically obtained by solving the following equations:
(ψ1 − γ1)c1X1γ1 − (ψ1 − η1)b1X1η1
+(ψ1 − β1)a1X1β1 − ψ1θK1 = 0 Case A
(ψ1 − γ2)c4X1γ2 − (ψ1 − η1)b1X1η1
+(ψ1 − 1)X1 − ψ1 (Λ2K2 + θK1) = 0 Case B
(40)





η1 for X < Xc11
L(X) for Xc11 6 X < X1
















ψ2 − (1− Λ4) a1Xc11

















d34 = d54 +
(





















d64 = d43 + (Λ4 − Λ3)







and the trigger, X1, is numerically obtained by solving the following equations:
−(ψ1 − ψ2)d43X1ψ2 + (ψ1 − γ1)c1X1γ1 + (ψ1 − β1) (1− Λ4) a1X1β1
−ψ1 (θ − Λ3)K1 = 0 Case C
−(ψ1 − ψ2)d64X1ψ2 + (ψ1 − γ2)c4X1γ2 + (ψ1 − 1) (Λ1 − Λ3)X1
−ψ1 ((Λ2 − Λ3)K2 + (θ − Λ3)K1) = 0 Case D
(49)
Case 2: Single stage investment
For the case of a single stage investment, Equation (18) is used to find the solution to
the ODE (30). The solution with two branches, considering the boundary condition when





η1 for X < Xc12
e3X
ψ1 + e4X
ψ2 + Λ3(X − (K1 +K2)) for X > Xc12
(50)
Cases E and F The value of the investment opportunity is:
F (X) =
e11Xψ1 + b2Xη1 for X < X1G(X)− θK1 for X > X1 (51)
where







and the trigger, X1, is numerically obtained by solving the following equations:
(ψ1 − γ1)c1X1γ1 − (ψ1 − η1)b2X1η1 + (ψ1 − β1)a1X1β1 − ψ1θK1 = 0 Case E
(ψ1 − γ2)c4X1γ2 − (ψ1 − η1)b2X1η1 + (ψ1 − 1)X1 − ψ1 (Λ2K2 + θK1) = 0 Case F
(53)





η1 for X < Xc12
e33X
ψ1 + e43X
ψ2 + Λ3(X − (K1 +K2)) for Xc12 6 X < X1
G(X)− θK1 for X > X1
(54)
where

















e43 = (1− Λ3)







and the trigger, X1, is numerically obtained by solving the following equations:
−(ψ1 − ψ2)e43X1ψ2 + (ψ1 − γ1)c1X1γ1 + (ψ1 − β1)a1X1β1
+(ψ1 − 1)Λ3X1 − ψ1 (θK1 − Λ3(K1 +K2)) = 0 Case G
−(ψ1 − ψ2)e43X1ψ2 + (ψ1 − γ2)c4X1γ2
+(ψ1 − 1)(Λ1 − Λ3)X1 − ψ1((Λ2 − Λ3)K2 + (θ − Λ3)K1) = 0 Case H
(58)
3 Numerical example and comparative statics
Let us consider the case of a real estate firm contemplating the acquisition of a piece
of rural land that does not have a construction permit. The land development may be
allowed in future at an unknown date, here modeled as an Poisson event with an arrival
rate of λE . Additionally, the investment opportunity is shared with hidden competitors
that may preempt the firm (with an arrival rate of λC). The land acquisition, that
eliminates competition, may be optimal prior or after the construction permit being issued.
Using a numerical example, we illustrate how the optimal decision is affect by the model
parameters, presented in Table 2.
Table 3 tabulates several numerical examples, including some limiting cases. When
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Table 2: The base case parameters
Parameter Description Value
σ Volatility of the cash flows 0.1
r Risk-free rate 0.04
α Risk-neutral growth rate of the cash flows 0.02
K1 Cost of the land after the permit (stage 1) 10
θK1 Cost of the land before the permit (stage 1) 9
K2 Development cost (stage 2) 50
λE Arrival rate of the construction permit 0.05
λC Arrival rate of a competitor 0.1
the permit to construct has a zero probability of being issued (λE → 0) investment will
never occur (X1 →∞). When the permit is imminent (λE →∞), investment is hastened
the most (the difference between X1 < X
c
1 reaches the maximum.
6 For the particular case
where both events (the arrival of a competitor and the permit - λE →∞ and λC →∞) are
imminent, the firm will invest at the minimum threshold possible, paying θK1 to secure
the exclusive option to invest in the development stage (H(X) = a1X
β1) when the payoff
is zero (H(X) = θK1).
Figure 2 shows that a higher risk of a competitor arrival (λC) or a higher likelihood of
the construction permit being issued (λE) induce an earlier investment. When these events
have a low probability of occurrence, the investment is delayed and can even occur later
than when the land development becomes optimal, if allowed (X1 > X2). The figure also
shows that a higher discount (lower θ) of acquiring the land before the permit accelerates
investment. When we compare the thresholds for the acquisition of the land before and
after the permit is issued (X1 and X
c
1), it is possible to conclude that the level of discount
(θ) determines if the investment in the first stage occurs later or sooner than when it
becomes optimal after the permit. In particular, when there is no discount (θ = 1) it is
always optimal to invest later if the permit has not been issued (X1 > X
c
1).
The firm also faces another source of risk - the cash flows risk measured by the volatility
parameter σ. Figure 3 shows an unusual effect of uncertainty. Usually uncertainty deters
investment in real options models. In the current model, it first deters investment, then,
for intermediate levels of uncertainty, investment is hastened, and, finally, high levels
of uncertainty deter investment again. This effect seems to be channeled through the
threshold Xc11 (Equations (14)). This is the threshold for investment in the first stage,
in a staged investment strategy, after the issuance of the construction permit. The effect
6Our model converges to the Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch. 10) sequential investment case, where
investment occurs always in a single stage, when there is no competition, the exogenous event is imminent,
and there is no discount (λE → ∞, λC → 0, and θ = 1).
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Table 3: Numerical examples
λE λC θ X1 X
c
1 X2 Type Case Eq. X1
0 ∀ ∀ ∞ − 121.3 − − −
0.05 0 0.9 151.7 145.5 121.3 Single stage H (58)
0.05 0.008 0.9 124.0 123.7 121.3 Single stage H (58)
0.05 0.1 0.9 50.4 53.0 121.3 Staged A (40)
0.05 ∞ 0.9 36.7 38.2 121.3 Staged A (40)
0.05 0 1 153.4 145.5 121.3 Single stage H (58)
0.05 0.01 1 121.9 116.7 121.3 Staged D (49)
0.05 0.1 1 54.5 53.0 121.3 Staged C (49)
∞ 0 0.9 125.3 145.5 121.3 Single stage F (53)
∞ 0.008 0.9 96.7 123.7 121.3 Single stage E (53)
∞ 0.1 0.9 43.0 53.0 121.3 Staged A (40)
∞ ∞ 0.9 34.0 38.2 121.3 Staged A (40)
∞ 0 1 145.5 145.5 121.3 Single stage G (58)
∞ 0.01 1 116.7 116.7 121.3 Staged C (49)
∞ 0.1 1 53.0 53.0 121.3 Staged C (49)
σ = 0.1, r = 0.04, α = 0.02, K1 = 10, K2 = 50. X1 is the stage 1 investment threshold. X2 is the stage
2 investment threshold and it is obtained with Equation (6). Xc1 is the staged 1 investment threshold
after the permit is issued, and it is obtained with Equation (14) or (20), depending on the condition in
Equation (15). Solving it for λC , the critical level is λ
∗
C = 0.00928. For λC > λ
∗
C the staged investment is
the optimal strategy.
of uncertainty on Xc11 is twofold: (i) on the one hand a higher uncertainty (lower η1)
increases the threshold and (ii) on the other hand it makes the option to invest in the
development stage more valuable (increasing a1X
β1), which promotes investment. These
two effects dominate for different levels of uncertainty. The figure also shows, as in the
previous figure, that a discount in the investment cost can induce investment sooner before
than after the permit is issued. This effect is higher for low levels of uncertainty. A high
uncertainty decreases the incentive to secure the investment opportunity before the permit.
The effect of the investment costs are depicted in Figure 4. Higher investment costs
delay investment. When the cost of the land (K1) is not sufficiently smaller than that of
the development stage (K2), the firm invests in the first stage and waits for the permit,
which will prompt the development stage investment.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a model to determine the value and optimal timing of an opportunity
to invest in a random start American real option. A random start American option
materializes into an American option only after an exogenous event, such as a permit or







































σ = 0.1, r = 0.04, α = 0.02, λC = 0.1, λE = 0.05, K1 = 10, K2 = 50.X1 is the stage 1 investment
threshold and it is obtained with Equations (40), (49), (53) or (58), according to the cases presented in
Table 1. X2 is the stage 2 investment threshold and it is obtained with Equation (6). X
c
1 is the staged 1
investment threshold after the permit is issued,and it is obtained with Equation (14) or (20), depending
on the condition in Equation (15).
Figure 2: Sensitivity of the investment thresholds to λC and λE
destroying the value of the opportunity to invest.
We show that investment is deterred when the risk of competition is low or the proba-
bility of arrival of a permission to invest in the development stage is also low. Investment
is also deterred for high investment costs in both stages. The effect of uncertainty is shown
to be non-monotonic. For low and high uncertainty levels an increase in uncertainty deters
investment, and for intermediate uncertainty levels the effect is the reverse.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity of the investment thresholds to K1 and K2
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